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The European debate on abuse of dominance issues in antitrust has been recently characterized by 
an emphasis on purely economic aspects, and by an emerging consensus on the merits of taking 
an “effects-based approach” aimed at the maximization of consumer welfare and the protection of 
competition. The European Commission has recently issued a Guidance Paper on exclusionary 
abuses which purports to move EU enforcement on abuse of dominance in this direction. In spite 
of these developments, we are still far from reaching any consensus on the best way to apply 
competition  policy  to  specific  issues  such  as  predatory  pricing,  bundling,  vertical  restraints, 
exclusive dealing and so on. We analyze the genesis of the European approach to antitrust and 
discuss  the  leading  economic  theories  on  competition  policy  and  abuse  of  dominance,  as 
developed  by  the  Chicago  School,  the  post-Chicago  approach  and  the  endogenous  market 
structures approach. Finally, we use these economic foundations to analyze the EU approach to 
abuse  of  dominance,  we  examine  the  Guidance  Paper,  we  provide  a  comparison  with  the 
American approach, and we discuss the implications of some recent important cases.  
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The basis of the European approach to antitrust with reference to abuse of dominance 
issues is Art 102 of the Treaty. Its application has engendered a wide debate between 
economists,  antitrust  scholars  and  policymakers.  Enforcement  of  the  rules  against 
exclusionary  abuses,  in  particular,  has  revealed  fundamental  conflicts  arising  from 
differences in approach to industrial policy. Following a trajectory similar to that in the 
U.S., the European debate has been recently characterized by an emphasis on purely 
economic aspects, and by an emerging consensus on the merits of taking an “effects-
based approach” aimed at the maintenance of competition and consumer benefit (rather 
than protection of the interests of competitors ). The EU’s top enforcement authority, the 
European Commission, has recently issued a “Guidance” paper
1 which purports to move 
EU enforcement on abuse of dominance in this direction. In spite of these developments, 
we are still far from reaching any consensus on the best way to apply competition policy 
to specific issues such as predatory pricing, bundling, rebates, exclusive dealing and so 
on. This paper analyzes the genesis of the European approach to antitrust and discusses 
the  leading  economic  theories  on  competition  policy  and  abuse  of  dominance,  as 
developed  by  the  Chicago  School,  the  post-Chicago  approach  and  more  recent 
developments associated with the concept of endogenous entry in markets. Finally we use 
these  economic  foundations  to  analyze  the  EU  approach  to  abuse  of  dominance,  we 
examine  the  Guidance  paper,  provide  a  comparison  with  the  American  approach  to 
antitrust, and we discuss the implications of some recent important cases.  
 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  First,  in  Section  1  we  provide  a  short  historical 
discussion on the development of the European approach to competition policy and abuse 
of  dominance  in  particular.  In  Section  2  we  provide  an  introduction  to  the  leading 
economic theories on competition policy and abuse of dominance as developed by the 
Chicago  School,  and  to the  post-Chicago  approach  and  more  recent  developments  in 
industrial organization associated with the concept of endogenous entry in markets. In 
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Section 3 we use these economic foundations to analyze the EU approach to abuse of 
dominance,  we  examine  the  Guidance  paper,  provide  a  quick  comparison  with  the 
American approach, and we discuss the implications of some recent important cases. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
1. The development of the European approach to abuse of dominance 
 
The European Union has its origins in the common market for coal and steel established 
by the Treaty of Paris of 1952.
2 The aim of the ECSC Treaty, as stated in Article 2, was 
to contribute, through the common market for coal and steel, to economic expansion, 
growth of employment and a rising standard of living. In the light of the establishment of 
the common market, the ECSC Treaty introduced the free movement of products without 
customs duties or taxes. It prohibited discriminatory measures or practices, subsidies, aids 
granted  by  States or  special charges  imposed  by  States and restrictive  practices.  The 
Treaty’s  Article  66  contained  provisions  that  would  allow  the  newly  created  “High 
Authority” to intervene in case of distortions of competition on the markets for coal and 
steel: economic concentrations in the coal and steel sectors were subject to a notification 
procedure  and  had  to  be  authorised  before  they  could  proceed,  and  Article  66(7) 
empowered the High Authority to make recommendations to prevent enterprises with a 
dominant position from using that position for purposes contrary to those of the Treaty, 
and if necessary, to impose remedies.   
 
The origins of the concept of dominance evoked in Article 66(7) of the ECSC Treaty can 
be traced back to German competition law, which used this concept since the Abuse 
Regulation of 1923.
3 One reason for adopting the term dominance rather than the term 
                                                           
2 The ECSC Treaty expired on 23 July 2002. Thus, the coal and steel sectors are now subject to Articles 
101 and 102, rather than Articles 65 and 66 ECSC.  
3 Verordnung Gegen Missbrauch Wirtschaftlicher Machtstellungen, 1923, Reichsbesetzblatt, [R6B.1] I, 
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“monopolization”,  used  in  the  American  Sherman  Act
4,  was  the  influence  that  the 
German competition law had on the drafter of the ECSC Treaty, Jean Monnet.  
 
The notion of dominance has been addressed both in law and economics.
5 In the realm of 
economics, dominance has been analyzed by theories dealing with market leadership in 
oligopolistic market structures. In the realm of law, the concept of dominance is found in 
two sets of legal provisions, namely Article 102
6 and the EC Merger Regulation.
7 The 
legal definition of dominance has been an issue of intense debate. The standard legal 
definition of dominance was laid down by the Court of Justice in United Brands. The 
Court of Justice stated that:  
 
The dominant position thus referred to (by Article [102]) relates to a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of its consumers.
8  
 
In  Hoffmann-La  Roche
9  the  Court  of  Justice  defined  dominance  as  “a  position  of 
economic  strength  enjoyed  by  an  undertaking,  which  enables  it  to  behave  to  an 
appreciable  extent  independently  of  its  competitors,  its  customers  and  ultimately  of 
consumers”. The Court of Justice further stated in Hoffman-La Roche: 
                                                           
4 15 U.S.C. §2: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire 
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.” 
5  For a good economic introduction to the topic see Motta, Massimo, 2004, Competition Policy. Theory 
and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
6 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (ex 85 and 86 prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam which came into force on the 
1
st of May 1999. Article 12 of the Treaty of Amsterdam provided for the renumbering of the EC Treaty 
Articles from Article 85 and 86 to Article 81 and 82 respectively. The TFEU renumbered them from 81 and 
82 to 101 and 102 etc.). The EC Treaty was signed on 25
th of March 1957. 
7 Article 102 deals with the abuse of an already existing dominant position (ex post), whereas the ECMR 
deals with the prospective assessment of dominance (ex ante). 
8 Case 27/76, United Brands Co. and United Brands Continental BV v Commission [1978], ECR I-207. At 
§65. 
9 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR I-461, at §38.  Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
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Furthermore although the importance of the market shares may vary from one 
market to another the view may legitimately be taken that very large shares are in 
themselves, and save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a 
dominant position. An undertaking which has a very large market share and holds 
it for some time (…) is by virtue of that share in a position of strength…
10 
 
The statement from Hoffman-La Roche contains no definition of what is to be meant  by 
“some  time”.  Thus,  the  lack  of  a  consistent  definition  might  result  in  an  arbitrary 
interpretation. In Continental Can,
11 the Commission, in defining a “dominant position”, 
focused on the ability of entities to behave independently in making decisions that affect 
the market as a whole. There has been some attempt to use a consistent approach to the 
term in merger cases: the formulation of dominance in United Brands was echoed in the 
Court  of  Justice  Kali-Salz
12  decision  with  respect  to  collective  dominance.
13  As 
mentioned  above,  the  definition  of  dominance  contains  two  elements:  the  ability  to 
prevent effective competition and the ability to behave independently. However, what is 
unclear is how these two elements relate to each other.  
 
Four requirements must be met for the application of Article 102. One (or more, in the 
case of collective dominance) undertaking(s) must be in a dominant position, and such 
position must be held within the common market or a substantial part of it. In addition, 
                                                           
10 Case 85/76 Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission of the European Communities [1979] ECR-461 
at §41. 
11 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co. Inc v. Commission (Continental Can), [1973] 
ECR I-215. At §3. 
12 Case M308 Kali und Salz/MdK/Treuhand [1998] OJ C275/3; on appeal Cases 68/94 and C-30/95 France 
v Commission, Societe Commerciale es Potasses et de l’Azore (SCPA) v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375. 
13 See § 221 of case C-68/94 and C-30/95 France v Commission, Societe Commerciale es Potasses et de 
l’Azore (SCPA) v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375. According to this paragraph, in the case of an alleged 
collective dominant position, the Commission is therefore obliged to assess, using a prospective analysis of 
the reference market, whether the concentration which has been referred to it leads to a situation in which 
effective competition in the relevant market is significantly impeded by the undertakings involved in the 
concentration  and one  or  more  other undertakings  which together, in  particular because  of correlative 
factors  which  exist  between  them,  are  able  to  adopt  a  common  policy  on  the  market  and  act  to  a 
considerable extent independently of their competitors, their customers, and also of consumers. Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
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there must be an abuse and this must have an effect on inter-State trade.
14 Dominance is 
analyzed in relation to three variables: the product market, the geographical market and 
the  temporal  market.
15    Importantly,  Article  102 does not  prohibit  the  existence  of a 
dominant position, rather it only prohibits its abuse.
16 The main types of abuse are:
17 
excessive  pricing
18  (United  Brands),  predatory  pricing
19  (AKZO
20),  discriminatory 
pricing
21  (United  Brands),  refusal  to  supply
22  (Commercial  Solvents
23),  tying  and 
                                                           
14 Jones, Alison and Sufrin, Brenda, EC Competition Law-Text, cases and materials, second edition, 2004, 
Great Britain, p. 255. 
15 Craig Paul, and De Burca, Gráinne, EU law-text, cases and materials, third edition, 2003, Great Britain, 
p. 993. 
16 Korah, Valentine, An introductory guide to EC competition law and practice, fifth edition, 1994, Oxford, 
p. 83. 
17 An excellent and updated economic survey of the economic analysis of the main types of abuse can be 
found in Belleflamme, P., Peitz , M., 2010, Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies, Cambridge 
University Press. 
18 On excessive pricing see indicatively: Elliott D., (2007), “What is an excessive price?” Comp. L.I., 6(8), 
13-15,  Kon  S.,  Turnbull  S.  (2003),  “Pricing  and  the  dominant  firm:  implications  of  the  Competition 
Commission Appeal Tribunal's judgment in the Napp case”, E.C.L.R., 24(2), 70-86, Glader M., Larsen S., 
(2006)  “Article  82:  excessive  pricing”  Comp.  L.I.,  5(7), 3-5,  Geradin  D.,  Rato  M.,  (2006)  “Excessive 
pricing: in reply” Comp. L.I., 5(10), 3-5, Oliver P., (2006) “The concept of "abuse" of a dominant position 
under Article 102 EC: recent developments in relation to pricing” Euro. C.J., 1(2), 315-339. 
19 On predatory pricing see indicatively: Gal M., (2007) “Below-cost price alignment: meeting or beating 
competition? The France Telecom case” E.C.L.R., 28(6), 382-391, Gravengaard M. (2006), “The meeting 
competition  defence  principle  -  a  defence  for  price  discrimination  and  predatory  pricing?”  E.C.L.R., 
27(12), 658-677, Andrews P., (1998), “Is Meeting Competition a Defence to Predatory Pricing?--The Irish 
Sugar Decision Suggests a New Approach” E.C.L.R. 49, Eilmansberger T., (2005) “How to Distinguish 
Good From Bad Competition Under Article 102 EC: In Search of Clearer and More Coherent Standards 
for Anti-competitive Abuses” C.M.L.R. (PP) 129, OECD, “Competition Policy Roundtable on Predatory 
Foreclosure” (March 15, 2005), pp.1-279. 
20 Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359. 
21 On price discrimination/rebates see indicatively: OECD, “Competition Policy Roundtable on Loyalty and 
Fidelity  Discounts  and  Rebates”  (March  4,  2003),  pp.1-239,  Lang  J.T.,  (2005)  “Fundamental  Issues 
Concerning Abuse Under Article 102 EC” Regulatory Policy Institute 19, Lang J.T., (2002) “Defining 
Legitimate Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82” F.I.L.J. 83, Lorenz M., Lübbig 
M., and Russel A., (2005), “Price Discrimination, a Tender Story” E.C.L.R. 355, Akman P. (2007), “To 
abuse, or not to abuse: discrimination between consumers”, E.L. Rev., 32(4), 492-512, Gerard D., (2005) 
“Price Discrimination under Article 82(c) EC: Clearing up the Ambiguities” in (July) Global Competition 
Law Centre Research Papers on Article 102 EC 133, Lang J.T. and O'Donoghue R., (2002) “Defining 
Legitimate Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses under Article 82EC” 26 Fordham International 
Law Journal 83, Perrot A., “Towards an Effects-based Approach of Price Discrimination” in The Pros and 
Cons of Price Discrimination (Swedish Competition Authority, 2005), Ridyard D., (2002) “Exclusionary 
Pricing and Price Discrimination Abuses under Article 82--An Economic Analysis” 6 E.C.L.R. 286. 
22 On refusal to deal/essential facilities see indicatively: Nagy C. (2007), “Refusal to deal and the doctrine 
of essential facilities in US and EC competition law: a comparative perspective and a proposal for a 
workable analytical framework” E.L. Rev., 32(5), 664-685, Doherty B., (2001) “Just What Are Essential 
Facilities?” 38 C.M.L.R. 397, Jones A., “A Dominant Firm’s Duty to Deal: EC and US Antitrust Law 
Compared” in Handbook of Research in Transatlantic Antitrust (Philip Marsden, ed. 2006), Lang J.T. 
(1994),  “Defining  Legitimate  Competition:  Companies’  Duties  to  Supply  Competitors  and  Access  to 
Essential Facilities” 18 Fordham International Law Journal 437, Lao M., (2005) “Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
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bundling
24  (Hilti
25,  Tetra  Pak  II
26),  loyalty  rebates  (Hoffman-La  Roche),  abuse  of 
intellectual  property  rights  (Magill
27)  and  vexatious  litigation  (Promedia
28).  As  the 
judgment in Continental Can
29 clarified though, Article 102 did not set out an exhaustive 
enumeration of the types of abuses of a dominant position.
30  
 
For  dominance  to  exist  the  undertaking  concerned  must  not  be  subject  to  active 
competitive constraints. In other words, it must have substantial market power. It is also 
not required for a finding of dominance that the undertaking in question has eliminated 
all opportunity for competition on the market. In conducting the analysis of whether the 
allegedly dominant undertaking is indeed dominant, it is relevant to adopt an economic 
approach  and  assess  in  particular  the  market  position  of  the  allegedly  dominant 
undertaking, the market positions of competitors, barriers to expansion and entry, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Antitrust Intent and Sacrifice” 73 Antitrust Law Journal 171, OECD, “The Essential Facilities Concept” 
Background Note, OCDE/GD(96)113, Robinson G, (2002) “On Refusing to Deal with Rivals” 87 Cornell 
Law  Review  1177,  Stratakis  A.,  (2006),  “Comparative  Analysis  of  the  US  and  EU  Approach  and 
Enforecement of the Essential Facilities Doctrine” 27 E.C.L.R. 434, Venit J., (2005) “Article 82: The Last 
Frontier – Fighting Fire with Fire?” 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1157. 
23 Cases 6&7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp v Commission 
(Commercial Solvents) [1974] ECR 223. 
24 On tying and bundling see indicatively: Spector D. (2006), “From harm to competitors to harm to 
competition: one more effort, please!”, Euro. C.J., 2(1) Supp (Special issue), 145-162, Kuhn K-U., Stillman 
R., Caffarra C. (2005) “Economic theories of bundling and their policy implications in abuse cases: an 
assessment in light of the Microsoft case” Euro. C.J., 1(1), 85-121, Ridyard D. (2005), “Tying and bundling 
- cause for complaint?”E.C.L.R., 26(6), 316-319, Furse M. (2004), “Article 82, Microsoft and bundling, or 
"The Half Monti"” Comp. L.J., 3(3), 169-178, Jean Tirole, The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer, 1 Comp. 
Policy Int’l 1 (2005), Bellamy & Child, European Community Law of Competition, 6
th ed., 2008, para 
10.119-10.120, Bishop/Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2
nd 
edition, 2002, 209, W.S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.R.19 (19-36) 
(1957), Hylton/Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A decision-theoretic approach, 69 Antitrust L.J. 469 (486) 
(2001), Christian Ahlborn/David S. Evans/A. Jorge Padilla, The antitrust economics of tying: a farewell to 
per se illegality, The Antitrust Bulletin/Spring-Summer 2004, 287 (323), KN Hylton & M Salinger, Tying 
Law and Policy: A Decision – Theoritic Approach, 69 Antitrust Law Journal, 469 (470-71) (2001), K-U 
Kühn, R Stillman, C Caffarra, Economic Theories of Bundling and Their Policy Implication in Abuse 
Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4756 (2005), Thomas A. 
Lampert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 Minn. L. Rev.  1688,  1700-1705 (2004-2005), Daniel A. 
Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice Predation, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 27, (2005) . 
25 Case T-30/89, Hilti v Commission [1991], ECR II-1439, confirmed C-53/92P, [1994] ECR I-666. 
26 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission (Tetra Pak II), [1994] ECR II-755. 
27 Magill TV Guide [1989] OJ L78/43. 
28 Case T-111/96, ITT Promedia NV v Commission (Promedia), [1998] ECR II-2937. 
29 Case 72/71 Re Continental Can Co. Inc. [1972] OJ L7/25. 
30 See further: Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co. Inc v Commission (Continental Can), supra 
note 62, at § 26. Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
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market positions of buyers. The existence of a dominant position may derive from several 
factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily determinative.  
 
The concept of dominance has been analyzed by leading economists in the Report by the 
Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy “An economic approach to Article 
82”.
31  According  to  this Report,  traditional  means  of  establishing  dominance through 
information about market structure are proxies for the determination of dominance – they  
assess  the  ability  to  exert  power  and  impose  abusive  behavior  on  other  market 
participants.
32 It is clear that an economic approach is needed, in order to be sure that one 
is  evaluating  the  alleged  competitive  harm  on  the  basis  of  how  competition  in  the 
particular  market  actually  works  and  what the  practice  in  question  means  for market 
participants.  The  standard  for  assessing  whether  a  given  practice  is  detrimental  to 
competition or whether it is a legitimate tool of competition should be derived from the 
effects of the practice on consumers.
33 Most important,  the Economic Advisory Group 
argued that taking a more the economic or effects-based approach towards Article 102 
implies  that  there  is  no  need  to  establish  a  preliminary  and  separate  assessment  of 
dominance. The emphasis should be on establishing significant competitive harm which 
is already proof of dominance (since a non-dominant company would not have the ability 
                                                           
31  The  Report  was  written  by  Jordi  Gual  (IESE  Business  School  and  “la  Caixa”,  Barcelona),  Martin 
Hellwig (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn), Anne Perrot (University Paris I 
and  Conseil  de  la  Concurrence,  Paris),  Michele  Polo  (Bocconi  University,  Milan),  Patrick  Rey 
(Coordinator,  University  of  Toulouse),  Klaus  Schmidt  (University  of  Munich)  and  Rune  Stenbacka 
(Swedish School of Economics, Helsinki and RUESG, University of Helsinki). 
32 EAGCP Report page 14. 
33 The OECD in its policy brief on Substantial Market Power and Competition
33 argued that there is 
substantial agreement that single firm conduct provisions should apply only to firms with a high degree of 
market power. Unilateral acts by a firm with high degree of market power are much more likely to harm 
consumer welfare and distort the competitive process than are unilateral act by firms with little or no 
power. The OECD adds that there is no single, clear economic test that can be used to distinguish between 
market power that is of concern in unilateral conduct cases and the lesser degree of market power that 
should not be. It all depends on the ability of undertakings to adversely influence competition. Thus, it is 
clear that non-dominant firms can also have an adverse impact on consumer welfare by adopting unilateral 
acts. The importance of the dominance test lies in the fact that a screening based on a legal concept similar 
to the economic notion of market power prevents the prohibition of pro-competitive unilateral practices, 
thus reducing Type I errors (i.e. prohibit a conduct which is not anticompetitive). Competition authorities 
and courts could focus their assessment on the economic impact of an allegedly anticompetitive conduct, 
and  apply  competition  legislation  to  genuinely  anticompetitive  unilateral  conduct,  without  having  to 
analyze first whether a dominant position exists. Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
  9 




..in proposing to reduce the role of separate assessments of dominance and to 
integrate  the  substantive  assessment  of  dominance  with  the  procedure  for 
establishing  competitive harm  itself, we depart  from  the  tradition  of  case  law 
concerning Art. 102 of the Treaty, but not, we believe, from the legal norm itself. 
Article 102 of the Treaty is concerned not just with dominance as such, but with 
abuses of dominance. The case law tradition of having separate assessments of 
dominance  and  of  abusiveness  of  behaviour  simplifies  procedures,  but  this 
simplification involves a loss of precision in the implementation of the legal norm.  
 
The structural indicators which traditionally serve as proxies for “dominance” 
provide an appropriate measure of power in some markets, but not in others. In a 
market  where  these  indicators  do  not  properly  measure  the  firm’s  ability  to 
impose  abusive  behaviour  on  others,  the  competition  authority’s  intervention 
under traditional modes of procedure is likely to be inappropriate, too harsh in 
some cases and too lenient in others. Given that the Treaty itself does not provide 
a separate definition of dominance, let alone call for any of the traditionally used 
indicators as such, it seems more appropriate to have the implementation of the 
Treaty itself focus on the abuses and to treat the assessment of dominance in this 
context. 
 
They also argue that:
35  
 
This approach also allows us to capture in a balanced and meaningful way the 
notion of special responsibility of a dominant firm… Since in this analysis we do 
not  need  to  assess  the  existence  of  dominance  separately,  the  special 
                                                           
34 § 14. 
35 § 15. Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
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responsibility implicitly applies to any conduct and firm that (is able to) interfere 
and distort the competitive process of entry into the market.
36 
 
Both  these  points  illustrate  a  generalization  of  the  application  of  Article  102  to  any 
conduct and firm that (is able to) interfere and distort the competitive process of entry 
into  the  market.  A  thorough  assessment  of  the  conditions  for entry,  --  of    how  easy  
and/or rapid entry can be is always essential in order to judge the ability of a firm or firms 
to harm consumers. 
 
The Economic Advisory Group adds that an economic approach to Article 102 should 
focus on improving consumer welfare and, thus, should avoid confusion between the 
protection  of  competition  and  the  protection  of  competitors.  An  economic-based 
approach  would  require  a  careful  examination  of  how  competition  works  in  each 
particular market in order to evaluate how specific unilateral conduct affects consumer 
welfare. Such an approach would ensure that anti-competitive behavior does not outwit 




On this basis, in the next section we review the development of the economic theory of 
antitrust  policy  and  emphasize  the  theoretical  foundations  of  an  updated  economic 
approach to abuse of dominance and, in particular, to exclusionary abuses. 
 
2. Economic analysis of abuse of dominance issues: old and new approaches 
 
2.1. The Chicago Law School 
 
Much of the academic debate on the role of antitrust policy has taken place in the U.S., 
where the field was first established in the 19
th century. Only subsequently, and with a 
                                                           
36 Thus, more than one firm can have this special responsibility since more than one non-dominant firm 
may have the ability to interfere and distort the competitive process of entry into the market. 
37 See further page 2. EAGCP Report. Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
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certain delay, did it spread to Europe. During the 1950s and ’60s, the studies associated 
with the University of Chicago Law School introduced a systematic economic approach 
to  antitrust  focusing  on  the  defense  of  consumers  and,  in  economic  terms,  on  the 
protection of consumer surplus and/or total welfare as the primary objectives of antitrust 
policy.
38  Most  scholars  in  this  tradition  had  a  laissez-faire  view  of  mergers  and 
exclusionary practices: the idea was that when there are entrants that provide a strong 
competitive pressure in a given sector, mergers are mostly aimed at creating beneficial 
cost efficiencies, and aggressive strategies such  as bundling, price discrimination and 
exclusive  dealing  are  not  necessarily  anti-competitive,  but  instead  usually  have  an 
efficiency rationale.  
 
For instance, according to this view, bundling is generally done for price discrimination 
purposes and not for exclusionary purposes.  According to the so-called single-monopoly 
profit  theorem  a  monopolist in  one  market  cannot  use tying  or any other  practice  to 
leverage market power in a secondary market where entry is free. Similarly, exclusive 
dealing cannot be used to exclude more efficient entrants because consumers would need 
compensation to sign an exclusivity agreement, yet the gains created by an entrant are too 
large to be compensated by an inefficient incumbent. Finally, according to a widespread 
view in the Chicago school, there is no such thing as predatory pricing: the main reason is 
that, if the predator can sustain the initial losses needed to induce the exit of a rival, the 
rival can also sustain the induced losses (on condition that credit markets are working 
properly),  therefore  predatory  pricing  would  be  ineffective.
39  Notice,  however,  that 
Posner has recently taken a less extreme position, proposing a moderate standard for 
judging practices claimed to be exclusionary: “in every case in which such a practice is 
alleged, the plaintiff must prove first that the defendant has monopoly power and second 
that the challenged practice is likely in the circumstances to exclude from the defendant's 
market an equally or more efficient competitor. The defendant can rebut by proving that 
although it is a monopolist and the challenged practice exclusionary, the practice is, on 
                                                           
38 See Bork, Robert, 1993, The Antitrust Paradox. A Policy at War with Itself, The Free Press, New York, 
and Posner, Richard, 2001, Antitrust Law, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
39  McGee,  John,  1958,  Predatory  Price  Cutting:  the  Standard  Oil  (N.J.)  Case,  Journal  of  Law  and 
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balance,  efficient”.
40  This  efficiency  defense  is  at  the  basis  of  the  “rule  of  reason” 
approach, for which a business practice is not “per se” illegal, but can be justified if it 
does not harm consumers or if it creates efficiencies. 
 
The Chicago school provided fundamental insights into many antitrust issues, but it failed 
to provide a complete understanding of the behavior of market leaders. In particular, it 
limited  most  of  its  analysis  to  the  understanding  of  how  monopolistic  and  perfectly 
competitive markets work, and in a few cases it focused on markets characterized by a 
monopolist  facing  a  competitive  fringe  of  potential  entrants.  However,  it  largely 
neglected the role of imperfect competition and technological conditions departing from 
those assumed under perfect competition. 
 
Dismissing the important advances in the application of game theory, the Chicago school 
ignored  the  role  of  the  strategic  interactions  between  incumbents  and  entrants.  The 
consequence was that its approach to exclusionary practices has been often biased against 
a pro-competitive role played by the incumbents without an updated theoretical support, 




2.2. The post-Chicago approach 
 
In the 80s, while the Chicago school was succeeding in raising the threshold for antitrust 
intervention  in  the  US,  a  (later  called)  post-Chicago  approach  started  to  expand  its 
influence  amongst  economists  and,  in  the  following  decade,  also  amongst  antitrust 
scholars.  This  approach  has  introduced  new  game  theoretic  tools  to  study  complex 
market structures and derive sound normative implications, always for the maximization 
of consumer surplus (in line with the economic consensus). For instance, with reference 
to exclusionary practices, the post-Chicago approach has shown that in the presence of 
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strategic  commitments  to  undertake  preliminary  investments,  asymmetric  information 
between firms,
41 limited forms of irrational (non-profit-maximizing) behavior or credit 
market imperfections, predatory pricing can be an equilibrium strategy for the incumbent, 
deterring entry and harming consumers. Similarly, it has shown that bundling can be used 
to  strengthen  price  competition  and  exclude  a  rival  from  a  secondary  market.
42 
Analogously,  many other strategies can have an exclusionary purpose,  while mergers 
have typically an accommodating purpose which again hurts consumers. 
 
One should keep in mind that many of the conclusions of the post-Chicago approach  
depend on a number of restrictive assumptions. For example, predatory pricing has been 
shown  to  be  exclusionary  under  extreme  circumstances,  including  forms  of  irrational 
behavior  (in  reputation  models)  or  pervasive  market  imperfections,  and,  even  when 
exclusion emerges under more plausible conditions, it is not necessarily associated with a 
pricing below cost or even with reductions in consumer welfare (in signaling models), 
which is what should matter from an antitrust point of view. 
 
Another  crucial  limitation  of  the  post-Chicago  approach  and  modern  game  theoretic 
literature that has been identified in the most recent literature is that in most cases, they 
have focused on the behavior of incumbent monopolists facing a single potential entrant. 
To cite only the best-known examples, this was the case for the Dixit model of entry 
deterrence, the models by Milgrom and Roberts of predatory pricing, by Fudenberg and 
Tirole on strategic investment, by Rey and Stiglitz and Bonanno and Vickers on vertical 
restraints, by Whinston on bundling for entry deterrence purposes and by Fumagalli and 
Motta and Abito and Wright on exclusive dealing, as well as many other works based on 
analysis of duopolies.
43  Also most of the standard results on the behavior of incumbents 
                                                           
41 Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John, 1982, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: an 
Equilibrium Analysis, Econometrica, 50, 2, 443-59. 
42 Whinston, Michael, 1990, Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion, The American Economic Review, 80, 837-
59. 
43  See  Abito,  Jose  Miguel  and  Julian  Wright,  2008,  Exclusive  dealing  with  imperfect  downstream 
competition, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26, 227-46;    Bonanno, Giacomo and John 
Vickers, 1988, Vertical Separation, Journal of Industrial Economics, 36, 257-265; Bulow, Jeremy, John 
Geanakoplos and Paul Klemperer, 1985, Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements, 
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in  terms  of  pricing,  R&D  investments,  mergers,  quality  choices  and  vertical  and 
horizontal differentiation are derived in simple oligopolistic models, where the incumbent 
chooses its own strategies in competition with a fixed number of competitors. While this 
analysis simplifies the interaction between incumbents and competitors, it can be highly 
misleading, since  it  assumes  away  the  possibility of  endogenous  entry,  and  therefore 
limits its relevance to situations where the incumbent already has an exogenous amount 
of  market  power.  In  most  (unregulated)  markets  entry  of  firms  can  be  regarded  as 
endogenous (if the analysis examines conduct over a reasonable period of time), therefore 
a relevant benchmark for antitrust theory must be the analysis of strategies by leaders in 
markets where the number of competitors is endogenous. 
 
2.3. The endogenous entry approach to competition policy 
 
The entry conditions of the market must be at the core of any economic approach to 
antitrust. Even if these have been often mentioned in the law & economics literature on 
antitrust policy, they have only recently been introduced in the theoretical analysis and in 
its application to antitrust issues. In this section we examine this recent evolution. 
 
The traditional industrial organization literature has emphasized the important role played 
by barriers to entry, but there has been much debate as to definitions of what constitutes a 
meaningful barrier to entry. Bain associated it with a situation in which established firms 
can  elevate  their  selling  prices  above  minimal  average  costs  of  production  without 
inducing entry in the long run.
44 Broadly speaking, such a situation corresponds to what 
we define as competition between an exogenous number of firms: even if positive profits 
can be obtained by a new firm in the market, entry is not possible. Stigler has proposed a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Deterrence, The Economic Journal, 90, 95-106;  Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, 1984, The Fat Cat 
Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy and the Lean and Hungry Look, The American Economic Review, Papers and 
Procedeengs, 74 (2), 361-68; Fumagalli, Chiara, and Massimo Motta, 2006, Exclusive Dealing and Entry, 
When Buyers Compete, The American Economic Review, 96 (3), 785-95; Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, 
John,  1982,  Limit  Pricing  and  Entry  Under  Incomplete  Information:  an  Equilibrium  Analysis, 
Econometrica, 50, 2, 443-59; Rey, Patrick and Joseph Stiglitz, 1988, Vertical Restraints and Producers' 
Competition, European Economic Review, 32, 561-68. 
44 Bain Joe, 1956, Barriers to new competition: their character and consequences in manufacturing industry. 
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different definition of barriers to entry, associating them with costs of production which 
must be borne by firms seeking to enter an industry but not borne by the incumbents; a 
similar approach has been prevailing more recently so that we can talk of barriers to entry 
as sunk costs of entry for the competitors which are above the corresponding costs of the 
incumbent (or have been already paid by the incumbent). According to this definition, 
subsequently  adopted  by  the  contestability  theory  of  Baumol  and  others  and  by  the 
endogenous  sunk  cost  approach  of  Sutton,
45  sunk  costs  can  be  binding  on  the  entry 
decisions of  followers, therefore, they can be a crucial determinant of the endogeneity of 
entry in a market. A final category is that of simple fixed costs of entry: these are faced 
equally  by  the  incumbent  and  by  followers,  but  they  can  also  represent  a  binding 
constraint on entry. While there is a fundamental difference between the concepts of sunk 
and fixed costs of entry, their role in endogenizing entry is virtually the same, and in the 
analysis that follows the two concepts will be assimilated more or less into one. Another 
important aspect concerns the source of these barriers and costs. They can constitute a 
legitimate cause of antitrust concern if they have been artificially created or enlarged by 
the incumbent; they cannot if their origin is purely technological. Nevertheless, according 
to the Chicago approach, it is hard to imagine how artificial barriers could be erected 
under normal circumstances, as we can conclude from the following position of Bork:  
 
If everything that makes entry more difficult is viewed as a barrier, and if barriers 
are bad, then efficiency is evil. That conclusion is inconsistent with consumer-
oriented policy. What must be proved to exist, therefore, is a class of barriers that 
do not reflect superior efficiency and can be erected by firms to inhibit rivals. I 
think it clear that no such class of artificial barriers exists.
 46  
 
                                                           
45 Baumol, William, John Panzar and Robert Willig, 1982, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry 
Structure, San Diego, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich; Stigler, George, 1968. The Organization of Industry, 
Homewood,  Ill.:  Richard  D. Irwin;  Sutton,  John,  1991,  Sunk  Costs  and  Market  Structure,  MIT  Press, 
London. 
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Recent  theoretical  advances  in  industrial  organization  have  proposed  an  economic 
approach to antitrust based on the analysis of endogenous market structures,
47 in which 
profit maximizing strategies and entry decisions by an endogenous number of firms are 
taken into account to verify the impact of different conducts on consumer surplus and 
welfare.  This  approach  combines  the  game-theoretic  foundations  of  the  post-Chicago 
approach with the emphasis on entry pressure typical of the Chicago approach, and can 
provide a bridge between the two leading approaches. 
 
In the endogenous market structure approach entry should be regarded as endogenous not 
when it is free, as in the perfectly competitive paradigm, but when sunk or fixed costs of 
entry constrain endogenously the number of firms that interact strategically in a market 
and  therefore  their  market  power.  A  number  of  normative  results  with  important 
implications  for  competition  and  innovation  policy  emerge  from  this  approach.  In 
particular,  the  theory  has  shown  that  whether  entry  in  a  market  is  exogenous  or 
endogenous makes a lot of difference for the way leaders behave. In markets where entry 
is  independent  of  profitability  conditions,  market  leaders  can  adopt  accommodating 
strategies to increase prices, or aggressive ones to exclude rivals and then monopolize the 
market; their strategies tend to harm consumers in both cases. However, when entry is 
endogenously  dependent  on  profitability  conditions  in the  market,  the  leaders always 
adopt aggressive strategies which typically do not harm consumers.
48 A few examples 
will illustrate  the point. 
 
Consider unilateral conduct by a firm. A firm competing with a single rival could engage 
in accommodating pricing to increase mark ups (i.e.: choosing a high price to induce the 
rival to do the same), or in predatory pricing to induce the exit of the rival, but a firm 
facing endogenous entry of competitors will ordinarily adopt aggressive pricing strategies 
without exclusionary purposes.  
 
                                                           
47 For an introduction to this approach see Etro, Federico, 2006a, Competition Policy: Toward a New 
Approach, European Competition Journal, Vol. 2 (March), 29-55 and 2010, Endogenous Market Structures 
and Antitrust Policy, International Review of Economics, Vol. 57, 1, pp. 9-46. 
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Consider a monopolist in a primary market competing also in a secondary market: when 
the  latter  is  characterized  by  a  single  rival,  the  monopolist  may  bundle  its  goods  to 
strengthen competition, induce the exit of the rival, and monopolize both markets (setting 
the monopolistic bundle price after the rival exits). However, when the secondary market 
is characterized by endogenous entry, the purpose of bundling can only be to strengthen 
price competition in the secondary market without inducing exit of all the competitors, 
and therefore without generating ex post monopolization: in other words, there cannot be 
a predatory purpose behind the bundling. 
 
Imagine now that an incumbent manufacturer is threatened by a more efficient entrant, 
and  both  can  only  sell  to  consumers  through  retailers.  If  the  number  of  retailers  is 
exogenous, the incumbent may deter entry with an exclusive dealing contract with each 
retailer:  this  is  the  case  when  the  competition  downstream  is  strong  enough  and  the 
retailers can be easily convinced to sign an exclusive agreement which will lead to high 
prices. However, when entry in the downstream market is endogenous, high prices only 
attract entry of new retailers which will be served by the entrant manufacturer. In such a 
case, exclusive dealing contracts can only be unprofitable (under linear prices) or pro-




Finally, consider a merger between two firms in a market with price competition: if the 
number  of  firms  is  fixed  (for  instance  because  they  have  an  exclusive  and  superior 
technology), this stimulates an  accommodating  behavior  by  the  merged entity,  which 
tends to increase prices and profits, but when entry is endogenous this attracts entry and 
defeats the strategic purpose of the merger. The conditions under which such a merger 
can  hurt  consumers  have  been  investigated  recently  for  horizontal  mergers,
50  but  the 
same  results  apply  to  more  complex  cases  as  horizontal  agreements  for  R&D  joint 
                                                           
49 Ryoko Oki provided  insightful discussions on this point. 
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ventures or for the standardization of new technologies (which are harmless when taking 
place in markets with endogenous entry) or even cases of vertical mergers. 
 
Thus it should be evident that efficiency reasons can still motivate aggressive pricing, 
bundling,  exclusive  dealing  or  mergers.  In  this  respect,  the  overall  flavor  of  the 
endogenous market structure approach is reminiscent of the Chicago school, while the 
analysis  is  based  on  game  theoretic  foundations  consistent  with  the  post-Chicago 
tradition (and can be seen as complementary to it).  
 
It is clear that the relevance of these results depends on the relevance of the hypothesis 
that entry is endogenous in a given  market. One may argue that in most markets entry 
can be usually regarded as endogenous in the medium and long run, but not in the short 
run. If this is the case, and if antitrust policy is aimed at correcting distortions in the 
medium and long run (as opposed to short run distortions which self-correct through 
market mechanisms), then the results of the endogenous entry approach are potentially 
relevant for policymakers. However, if antitrust policy is also aimed at correcting short 
run distortions emerging in the absence of entry pressure, the traditional post-Chicago 
analysis based on exogenous entry applies. Antitrust enforcement thus needs to make a 
policy choice – whether the objective is to ensure an absence of distortions over the 
short-term, as well as the medium- and longer-term --, and an economic assessment – of 
whether entry conditions in the time-frame chosen are endogenous or not.  A rule of 
reason approach allows implementation on a case-by-case basis, taking account of the 
policy  choice  (elimination  of  short-term  vs.  elimination  of  medium-  or  longer-term 
distortions).  In  what  follows,  we  will  show  in  detail  the  implications  of  the  general 
economic  approach  to  abuse  of  dominance  issues  based  on  endogenous  entry 
considerations for markets with competition in quantities and prices. 
 
2.4 The behavior of dominant firms under competition in quantities 
 
A large part of the modern economic analysis of abuse of dominance deals with models 
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attributable  to  a  first  mover  advantage,  the  so-called  Stackelberg  advantage,  or  to  a 
preliminary commitment to market strategies.  We will analyze the two cases starting 
from that of a quantity leadership, in which dominance is associated with the ability to 
commit to a certain production level before competitors can. An important insight that 
emerges from an economic analysis of market leaders’ behavior that takes account of 
whether  they  are  facing  endogenous  entry  is  that it  shows  that  standard measures  of 
market concentration may be unreliable indicators of dominance or market power and 
may lead to misleading welfare comparisons. This point emerges quite clearly when we 
analyze different entry conditions in the simplest environment, that of competition in 
quantities with homogenous goods and firms using the same technology with constant 
marginal costs and a fixed cost of production. Such a simple structure approximates the 
situation of many sectors where product differentiation is not very important, but there 
are high start-up costs  (e.g. in many high-tech sectors).  
 
Let us consider first the case of an exogenous number of firms. In such a context, an 
increase (a reduction) in the output of a firm leads competing firms to reduce (expand) 
their  own  output,  although  not  to  the  extent  of  fully  compensating  the  initial  output 
change. As long as the fixed costs of production are not too high, the leader is aggressive 
but leaves space for the followers to be active in the market. As external observers, we 
would  look  at  this  as  a  market  characterized  by  an  incumbent  with  a  market  share 
typically larger than its rivals, but with a certain number of competitors whose supply of 
goods reduces the equilibrium market price. The higher the number of these competitors, 
the lower the price will be: in such a case, higher concentration (e.g. as a result of a 
merger) would correctly be associated with lower welfare. 
 
Radical changes occur when entry in the market is endogenous, and is determined by the 
existence of profitable opportunities in the same market.
51 In such a case the leader would 
expand production until noone of the potential entrants has incentives to supply its goods 
in the market. The intuition for this extremely aggressive behavior of the market leader is 
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simple. When entry is endogenous, the leader understands that a low production creates a 
large space for entry in the market while a high production reduces entry opportunities. 
More precisely, knowing how technological constraints govern the incentives to enter in 
the  industry,  the  leader  is  aware  that  its  output  exactly  crowds  out  the  output  of  
competitors, leaving unchanged the aggregate supply and hence the equilibrium price. 
However, taking this equilibrium price as given, the leader can increase its profits by 
increasing its output and reducing the average costs of production. Here the fixed costs of 
production  (associated  with  constant  marginal  costs)  are  crucial:  on  one  side  they 
constrain the profitability of entry, while on the other side they create scale economies in 
the production process that can be exploited by the leader through an expansion of its 
output. Actually, it is always optimal for the leader to produce enough to crowd out all 
the output of competitors: exploiting economies of scale over the entire market allows the 
leader to enjoy positive profits even if there is not an (equally efficient) competitor that 
could obtain positive profits from entering the market. As external observers, in this case, 
we would simply see a single firm obtaining positive profits in a market where no one 
else  enters,  and  we  might  erroneously  associate  this  situation  with  a  monopolistic 
environment. In reality, it is the competitive pressure of the potential entrants that induces 
the leader to produce so much to drive down the equilibrium price until no other (as-
efficient) firm can enter. One can even show that this equilibrium with only the leader in 
the market generates higher welfare than the endogenous entry equilibrium without a 
leadership,  which  would  involve  (too)  many  firms  active  in  the  market  earning  zero 
profits. 
 
A similar and more realistic situation emerges in the presence of U-shaped average cost 
functions or with some product differentiation: in these cases the dominant firm produces 
more  than  the  rivals  but  does  not  find  it  optimal  to  exclude  entry.  Moreover,  under 
endogenous  entry  the  output  expansion  of  the  dominant  firm  crowds  out  entry  of Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
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homogenous producers without affecting total production, and the price remains the same 
as in the absence of a leader, without negative consequences for consumers.
52 
 
The  crucial  lesson  from  this  analysis  is  that  we  should  be  careful  in  drawing  any 
conclusion  on  dominance  and  market  power  from  indices  of  concentration  or  from  
market  share.  Of  course,  abusive  behavior  can  be  still  associated  with  aggressive 
strategies aimed at foreclosing rivals and with negative consequences for consumers. But 
this  can  only  be  the  case  under  two  circumstances:  1)  when  these  strategies  are 
implemented by leaders with genuine market power which is not constrained by effective 
entry, or 2) when the same leader has built barriers to artificially constrain entry and 
without efficiency reasons. Of course, a complete analysis of the consequences of entry 
deterrence would require a dynamic model taking into account the behavior of the leader 
before  and  after  deterrence,
53  but  our  goal  here  is  only  to  emphasize  the  risk  of 
automatically  associating  aggressive  strategies  that  reduce  prices  and  entry  with 
exclusionary strategies that harm consumers. 
 
2.5. The behavior of dominant firms under competition in prices 
 
Other important implications of the general economic approach to antitrust emerge when 
goods differ in quality and firms compete on price. In this typical situation, the traditional 
                                                           
52 Let us consider the case of average costs with a U-shape. A market leader facing endogenous entry of 
competitors may not have incentives to produce enough to be alone in the market, but would still behave in 
an aggressive way. Notice that, given the strategy of the leader, all the entrants maximize their own profits 
and therefore they price above the marginal cost. However, endogenous entry reduces the equilibrium price 
at a level that is just high enough to cover the fixed costs of production. This equilibrium generates a 
production below the efficient scale (which should equate marginal and average costs). Also in this case, 
the  leader  takes  into  account  these  elements  and,  in  particular,  takes  as  given  the  equilibrium  price 
emerging from the endogenous entry of the competitors. Accordingly, the leader finds it optimal to produce 
enough to equate its marginal cost to the price, which requires a production above the efficient scale. Since 
marginal costs are increasing for such a high production level, the leader is pricing above its average cost, 
and hence obtains positive profits. In this case the strategy of the leader does not even affect the market 
price, which is fully determined by endogenous entry of firms. Nevertheless, the leader obtains a larger 
market share than its rivals and positive profits. Moreover, one can show that the aggressive behavior of the 
leader, that adopts a price equal to the marginal cost, improves the allocation of resources compared to the 
same market with free entry and no leadership. 
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analysis  of  Stackelberg  oligopolies  with  a  fixed  number  of  competitors  shows  that 
dominant firms are either accommodating (setting high prices) or trying to exclude rivals 
by setting prices that are low enough to drive them to exit the market. The first case 
occurs when the fixed costs of entry are small (and predation would be too costly). In this 
case, since prices tend to be “strategic complements,”
54 an increase in one firm’s prices 
triggers a positive response from the other firms, thereby further encouraging this firm to 
raise its own prices. Because of this strategic complementarity, the direct impact of an 
accommodating  conduct  on  the  market  is  exacerbated  by  the  rival  firms’  adaptation. 
Thus, more generally, the adoption of any anticompetitive conduct by any firm is likely 
to  induce  significant  consumer  harm,  since  the  rival  firms  will  not  be  able  to  fully 
compensate  for  the  consumer  harm  induced  by  this  conduct.  The  alternative  case  in 
which a dominant firm tries to exclude rivals with a predatory strategy occurs when fixed 
costs are high: in such a case a low price can induce followers to exit because they are 
unable to produce enough to cover their fixed costs. 
 
It is important to note that the inclination of the post-Chicago approach to see aggressive 
pricing strategies as predatory generates the risk of systematically - and erroneously - 
associating  any  aggressive  pricing  strategy  by  a  dominant  firm  with  an  abuse  of 
dominance. In reality, when we take into consideration the endogeneity of entry in the 
market, we find that dominant firms never adopt accommodating pricing strategies while 
they are always aggressive, and in a different way: in equilibria with price competition 
and  endogenous  entry,  leaders  increase  their  market share  and  obtain  positive  profits 
through an aggressive pricing strategy. This reduces entry, without excluding all rivals 
(as  long  as  product  differentiation  is  substantial),  while  strengthening  competition 
between  the  leader  and  a  smaller  number  of  rivals,  with  price  reductions  benefitting 
consumers.  
 
Therefore, we must be extremely careful in associating aggressive pricing with predatory 
intent. Traditionally, predatory strategies are considered anti-competitive because they 
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aim  to  exclude  future  competition,  allowing  the  dominant  firm  to  behave  in  a 
monopolistic fashion once competitors have been forced to exit the market. Clearly, if a 
low-price strategy is aimed at excluding some but not all competitors, the monopolistic 
threat is absent or, at least, more limited, and the gains for consumers in terms of low 






2.5. Strategic commitments by dominant firms 
 
In general, the above analysis is relevant also when market leaders cannot commit to 
output or pricing strategies, but they can undertake preliminary investments that change 
their incentives to adopt certain strategies in future. For instance, a market leader facing 
an exogenous number of competitors may elect either to under-invest or to over-invest in 
cost-reducing R&D, depending on the nature of the competition it is facing (respectively 
competition on price or competition on quantity), because it may want to commit through 
these investments to adopting an accommodating or an aggressive strategy in the market: 
underinvestment  is  optimal  in  the  face  of  price  competition,  while  overinvestment  is 
optimal in the face of competition in quantities.
55 However, this ambiguity collapses if 
the  leader  is  facing  endogenous  entry  of  competitors.  In  such  a  case,  strategic 
overinvestment in cost reducing R&D is always optimal, independently of the nature of 
the  competition,  because  it  allows  one  to  be  aggressive  against  competitors.
56  Both 
effective and potential competition are crucial here. On this point, we are close to early 
informal theories of the Chicago school. For instance, Posner noticed that: 
 
                                                           
55 See Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984. 
56 See Etro, 2006b. A similar role of the cited forms of preliminary investments is attached to investment in 
production  capacity,  to  the  adoption  of  debt  financing  (see  Etro,  Federico,  2010,  Endogenous  Market 
Structures and the Optimal Financial Structure, Canadian Journal of Economics , in press, Vol. 43, 4), and 
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notions of potential competition cannot and should not be banished entirely from 
antitrust law... a monopolist who creates excess capacity in order to reduce his 
marginal cost, so that entrants (who have to be able to cover their average total 




From  an  antitrust  point  of  view,  an  interesting  situation  emerges  when  demand  is 
characterized by network effects. In such a case, incumbent leaders tend to underprice 
their products initially in order to attract customers in the future. As is known, these 
strategies may include pricing below marginal cost without entry deterrence purposes. 
Moreover, dominant firms facing endogenous entry may have further strategic incentives 
to reduce initial prices (or expand initial production): by doing so, they enhance network 
externalities and are able to reduce their prices also in the future. Therefore, antitrust 
authorities  should  be  careful  when  evaluating  aggressive  pricing  in  the  presence  of 
network effects. This point applies in particular to multi-sided markets, where network 
effects  between  different  kinds  of  customers  can  be  observed,  and  firms  can  charge 
different customers differently. In such an environment dominant leaders tend to price 
one side of the market quite aggressively, but again without exclusionary purposes. 
 
The  same  care  is  required  in  the  analysis  of  complementary  strategies  that  induce 
aggressive  behavior.  One  of these  is  bundling.  In  an  influential  paper,  Whinston  has 
studied bundling in a market with two goods.
58 The primary good is monopolized by one 
firm,  which  competes  with  a  single  rival  in  the  market  for  the  secondary  good.  A 
commitment to bundle strengthens competition in the secondary market. Therefore, in 
case of entry of the single rival, it reduces the profits of the monopolist in both markets. 
However, in case of entry deterrence, the monopolist remains alone and can choose the 
monopolistic price of the bundle: even if this delivers lower profits than the uncostrained 
monopolistic  prices,  under  weak  conditions  it  is  a  profitable  strategy  and  reduces 
consumer utility. This is a classic example of a predatory strategy aimed at inducing exit 
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and establishing a monopoly. This conclusion, however, can be highly misleading when 
entry is endogenous: the assumption of a single rival neglects the possibility of additional 
competitors and further entry in the secondary market, which is quite important in many 
real  world  cases.  If  the  secondary  market  is  characterized  by  endogenous  entry,  the 
monopolist of the primary market will  always choose  to be aggressive in this market, 
and bundling may be the right way to commit to an aggressive strategy. Bundling would 
not necessarily deter entry in this case, especially if there is a high degree of product 
differentiation  in  the  secondary  market,  but  may  instead  increase  competition  in  this 
market and reduce prices, with positive effects on consumers.
59 
 
Another  application  of  the  theory  of  endogenous  market  structures  concerns  vertical 
restraints  affecting  inter-brand  competition  (Bonanno  and  Vickers;  Rey  and  Stiglitz). 
Also  in  this  case,  the  behavior  of  the  market  leader  can  be  anticompetitive  or  pro-
competitive depending on the entry conditions. In particular, under price competition, the 
optimal  contract  delegating  distribution  to  a  downstream  firm  tends  to  soften  price 
competition when entry in the market is exogenous, because the upstream firm imposes 
high prices through direct or indirect contractual restraints. However, the optimal contract 
strengthens price competition when entry is endogenous, in which case the upstream firm 
can  only  gain  by  inducing  aggressive  behavior  by  the  downstream  firm.  The 
consequences for consumers tend to be negative in the former case but positive in the 
latter case. 
 
Finally,  entry  conditions  are  crucial  also  for  analyzing  exclusive  dealing  between 
manufacturers and retailers, a field recently explored by economic theory (in particular 
by  Fumagalli  and  Motta  and  by  Abito  and  Wright).
60  Consider  an  incumbent 
manufacturer threatened by a more efficient entrant, and imagine that both of them can 
sell to consumers through retailers. If the number of retailers is exogenous, the incumbent 
                                                           
59 This point was first made by Etro (2006,b, 2010). 
60  See  Abito,  Jose  Miguel  and  Julian  Wright,  2008,  Exclusive  dealing  with  imperfect  downstream 
competition, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 26, 227-46; Fumagalli, Chiara, and Massimo 
Motta, 2006, Exclusive Dealing and Entry, When Buyers Compete, The American Economic Review, 96. 
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may deter entry with an exclusive dealing contract with each retailer: this is the case 
when the downstream competition is strong and retailers can be easily convinced to sign 
an exclusive agreement that will lead to high prices (for instance when the goods are 
homogenous,  or  nearly  so).  However,  when  entry  in  the  downstream  market  is 
endogenous, high prices attract entry of new retailers, and these new retailers will be 
served by the entrant manufacturer. In such a case, exclusive dealing contracts are either 
unprofitable  (under  linear  prices)  or  pro-competitive  (they  lead  to  aggressive  pricing 
without deterring entry in the presence of two-part tariffs).  
 
In conclusion, economic theory provides a wide range of models to understand abuse of 
dominance issues and, in particular, exclusionary strategies. The model of competition (in 
quantities or prices), the entry conditions (exogenous or endogenous) and the entry costs 
appear to be crucial to understanding the nature of the dominant firm conduct. On the 
basis of this theoretical apparatus, we will now review the state of the art of the approach 
to abuse of dominance in the EU. 
 
 
3.  An  Economic  Analysis  of  the  EU  approach  to  Article  102  TFEU  and  a 
comparison with the US approach 
 
In  this  section  we  use  the  economic  analysis  of  the  previous  section  to  evaluate  the 
economic foundations of the European approach to abuse of dominance, to provide a 
comparison with the American approach, and to comment on the most recent and relevant 
case law. 
 
3.1. The genesis of the European approach to consumer protection 
 
Economic  aspects  related  to  consumer  protection  have  been  always  present  in  the 
European  debate  on  competition  policy.  Early  European  Commission  Reports  on 
Competition Policy evoked the importance of consumer welfare. The  First Report on 
competition policy in 1971, stated that:  Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
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“competition  policy  endeavours  to  maintain  or  create  effective  conditions  of 
competition by means of rules applying to enterprises in both private and public 
sectors. Such a policy encourages the best possible use of productive resources 
for the greatest possible benefit of the economy as a whole and for the benefit, in 
particular of the consumer”.  
 
In spite of this, early  decisions by the Commission and the case law of the Court of 
Justice, notably in the 1970s, assimilated protection of competition to protection of the 
economic freedom of market actors.
61 Many decisions in these formative years were not 
based on economics or with consumer welfare in mind, but instead aimed to protect the 
economic freedom of market players and to prevent firms from using their economic 
power to undermine competitive structures.
62  
 
The legal definition of dominance as it has emerged through the case law suffers from 
some  important  shortcomings.  The  essence  of  the  Court  of  Justice  definition  of 
dominance  as  outlined  in  United  Brands  is  the  ability  to  act  independently  to  an 
appreciable extent of competitors, customers and consumers.
63 One of the criticisms of 
this definition of dominance is that in reality, it can never – or almost never – be satisfied: 
firms cannot act to an appreciable extent independently of their consumers, due to the 
downward-sloping demand curve which implies that the higher the price of the product, 
the  lower  the  quantity  demanded.  This  argument  holds  both  for  dominant  and  non-
dominant firms, and as Azevedo and Walker (2002) argue, “trying to define dominance 
with respect to the ability of a firm to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
consumers will not distinguish adequately between dominant and non-dominant firms”.
64  
                                                           
61 Kokkoris I. “A Gap in the Enforcement of Article 82”, BIICL, 2009. 
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Competition Law Review, vol.2, 2, March, p. 19. 
63 Case 27/76, United Brands Co. and United Brands Continental BV v Commission [1978], ECR I-207. At 
§65. 
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A  further  criticism  relates  to  the  difficulty  of  measuring  firms’  ability  to  behave 
independently from competitors. Every firm that faces competitors is constrained to some 
extent by the conduct of these competitors. The pricing policy of even a dominant firm is 
dependent on the pricing of its competitors. A dominant firm will raise prices above the 
competitive level to a point that will be determined by its demand curve, as well as by the 
constraints imposed on the firm by its competitors’ strategy. So even a dominant firm 
does not act completely independently of its competitors, nor  is it immune from the the 
pressure exerted by the potential entry of future competitors. This argument also holds in 




Azevedo and Walker (2002) argue that the definition of dominance as outlined in United 
Brands  could  be  made  more  economically  coherent  by  replacing    “behave  to  an 
appreciable extent independently” with “not restrained by the independent actions”.
66 
They also suggest an approach that mitigates the drawbacks related to the definition of 
dominance in United Brands. They argue that dominance can be defined as the ability to 
restrict output
67 substantially in the marketplace. Dominant firms have power over price 
and thus, by restricting output in the market, to decrease consumer welfare. According to 
these  authors,  focusing  on  output  restriction  is  consistent  with  most  of  the  standard 
factors that are usually considered relevant in the appraisal of dominance.
68 In addition, 
in cases where the observation of price and costs cannot be easily achieved, concentrating 
on  the  ability  to  reduce  quantity  may  provide  an  alternative  means  of  assessing 
dominance.  Thus,  according  to  the  authors,  this  definition  would  be  consistent  with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
537-549, Jones A. and Sufrin B. (2004), “EC Competition Law”, 2
nd ed., Oxford University Press, page264, 
Dobbs I., Richards P., (2005) “Output restriction as a measure of market power”, ECLR, 26(10), 572-580. 
65 For an economic analysis of the R&D behavior of leaders facing exogenous or endogenous entry and of 
the welfare consequences of equilibrium competition for the market see Federico Etro, 2004, Innovation by 
Leaders, The Economic Journal, Vol. 114, 495 (April), pp. 281-310. 
66 Azevedo and Walker (2002), page 366. 
67 The authors clarify that the definition refers to the restriction of total output in the market below its 
current level. 
68 Factors such as market shares, barriers to entry, barriers to expansion, spare capacity, substitute products. 
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current practice  and  would  have  a  firm  economic  foundation. However,  focusing the 
definition of dominance on the restriction of output may be considered to be too narrow 
and possibly inadequate to incorporate conduct that has an adverse impact on competition 
entailing limited or no output restriction.  One example of such an adverse impact would 
be a decline in quality. Notwithstanding the criticisms mentioned above, for our purposes 
dominance will be defined according to Court of Justice definition in United Brands. 
 
Another  criticism  concern  the  vague  relation  between  dominance  and  abuse.  In  the 
context of Article 102, as the Court of Justice argued in Continental Can, “there is no 
need for a causal link to be established between the dominant position and the abuse. It is 
necessary only  that  the  conduct  strengthens  the  undertaking’s  dominant  position  and 
fetters competition on the market”.
69 Consequently, a dominant undertaking can abuse its 
position  without  using  the  market  power  that  the  position  confers,  but  by  ordinary 
commercial practices also engaged in by non-dominant undertakings.
70 The market on 
which  the  abusive  conduct  takes  place  need  not  be  the  same  as  that  on  which  the 
dominant position is held;
71 although the alleged abusive conduct is normally found on 
the dominated market, it may also be found on a distinct, but closely associated market, 
where success can be leveraged to strengthen the position on the dominated market.
72 On 
the other side, under the EC Merger Regulation, as the Court of Justice confirmed in Kali 
und  Salz,
73  there  must  be  a  causal  link  between  the  creation  or  the  strengthening  of 
dominance and the adverse impact on effective competition.  
 
                                                           
69 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co. Inc v. Commission (Continental Can), [1973] 
ECR I-215, at §26-§27. 
70 Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co. Inc v Commission (Continental Can), at §27; Case 
85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR I-461, at §91 and §120. 
71 Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing SA vs. Commission (Tetra Pak I) [1990] E.C.R. II-309, [1991] 4 
C.M.L.R. 334, §25. 
72 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission (Tetra Pak II), [1994] ECR II-755, at §23-28. 
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As regards the definition of “abuse”, although there is no definition of the concept in 
legislation
74 the Court of Justice has on numerous occasions dealt with this concept; for 
instance, in Continental Can
75, it stated that,   
 
“…  abuse  may  therefore  occur  if  an  undertaking  in  a  dominant  position 
strengthens such position in such a way that the degree of dominance reached 
substantially fetters competition, i.e. that only undertakings remain in the market 
whose behaviour depends on the dominant one … it can … be regarded as an 
abuse if an undertaking holds a position so dominant that the objectives of the 
Treaty are circumvented by an alteration to the supply structure which seriously 
endangers the consumer’s freedom of action in the market such a case necessarily 
exists if practically all competition is eliminated.”
76 
 
The Court of Justice in that case concluded that Article 102 is aimed at practices which 
may cause damage to consumers directly, as well as to practices that are detrimental to 




78, the Court of Justice, widened the concept by holding it to be an 
“objective concept” relating to the behaviour of a dominant undertaking which influences 
the  structure  of the  market thereby  weakening  competition  through  methods  different 
from those of normal practice and having an effect of hindering the maintenance and the 
growth  of  competition.  A  dominant  undertaking  can  however,  protect  its  commercial 
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76 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp and Continental Can Co. Inc v. Commission (Continental Can), [1973] 
ECR I-215, § 26. 
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interests, but, the behaviour must be proportionate and not be intended to strengthen the 
dominant position and thereby abuse it.
79   
 
The  concept  of  abuse  is related  to  behaviour  by  an  undertaking which  is  such  as  to 
(negatively) influence the degree of competition through methods different from those 
ensuring  normal  competition.  Normal  competition  refers  to  a  situation  where  an 
undertaking has a substantial market share resulting from efficient performance regarding 
quality  of  product,  of  service,  efficient  marketing  and  distribution.  The  first  two 
paragraphs of Article 102 (a, b) refer to exploitative abuse of market power inducing 
harm to consumers. The final two refer to methods detrimental to consumers through 
their impact on effective competition structure.
80 
 
Turning to the objectives of Article 102, and to the approach that the Commission and 
National  Competition  Authorities  should  adopt  in  enforcing  Article  102,  Advocate 
General Jacobs has stated that:
81 
 
“[I]t is important not to lose sight of the fact that the primary purpose of article 
102 is to prevent distortion of competition - and in particular to safeguard the 
interest  of  consumers  -  rather  than  to  protect  the  position  of  particular 
competitors.” 
 
The General Court in the British Airways case explained: 
 
“Article  102  EC  does  not  require  it  to  be  demonstrated  that  the  conduct  in 
question  had  any  actual  or  direct  effect  on  consumers.  Competition  law 
concentrates  upon  protecting  the  market  structure  from  artificial  distortions 
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The European Commission Notice on the Application of Art.101(3) provides that: 
 
“The  concept  of  ‘consumers’  encompasses  all  direct  or  indirect  users  of  the 
products covered by the agreement, including producers that use the products as 
an input, wholesalers, retailers and final consumers, i.e. natural persons who are 
acting for purposes which can be regarded as outside their trade or profession. In 
other words, consumers within the meaning of Article 101(3) are the customers of 
the parties to the agreement and subsequent purchasers. These customers can be 
undertakings as in the case of buyers of industrial machinery or an input for 
further processing or final consumers as for instance in the case of buyers of 
impulse ice-cream or bicycles.”
83 
 
The  Commission  has  further  stated  that
84  the  objective  of  Article  101  is  to  protect 
competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare, which must be the 
same for Article 102, as both Article 101 and Article 102 seek to achieve the same aim.
85 
 
The former Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes argued that: 
 
“consumer  welfare  is  now  well  established  as  the  standard  the  Commission 
applies when assessing mergers and infringements of the Treaty rules on cartels 
and  monopolies  …  An  effects-based  approach,  grounded  in  solid  economics, 
ensures  that  citizens  enjoy  the  benefits  of  a  competitive,  dynamic  market 
economy.”
86  
                                                           
82 British Airways v Commission at 264. 
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In addition, Commissioner Kroes in her speech of 23 September 2005 to the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute mentioned that the objective of Article 102 is the protection of 
competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and ensuring an 
efficient allocation of resources.
87  Former Director General of DG Competition Philip 
Lowe  has  emphasized  that:  “competition  is  not  an  end  in  itself,  but  an  instrument 
designed to achieve a certain public interest objective, consumer welfare”.
88 
 
The Economic Advisory Group for Competition Policy in its report on Article 102 stated 
that:  
 
“Referring  to  this  [consumer  welfare  added]  standard  is  all  the  more  important 
because, in the actual proceedings on a given case, competitors are usually much 
better organized than consumers. The competition authority receives more complaints 
and more material from competitors, so the procedure tends to be biased towards the 
protection  of  competitors.  Developing  a  routine  for  assessing  consumer  welfare 
effects provides a counterweight to this bias.”
89 
 
Finally, according to Cseres: 
 
“the  adoption  of  the  consumer  welfare  standard  vis-à-vis  the  total  welfare 
standard  places  consumers’  economic  needs  and  responses  to  firm  behaviour 
further into the focus of competition law enforcement. It, counterbalances firms’ 
information  advantages,  lobbying  advantages,  the  fact  they  are  better 
represented,  as  well as  their  first  mover  advantages  in selecting  the strategic 
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moves they pursue. The consumer welfare standard seems, from both the legal 
and political aspect, an appropriate standard of enforcement.”
90  
 
In Europe there has been continuing debate over the concept of consumer welfare, and 
whether the concept should be construed narrowly or broadly.
 One can distinguish three 
components of consumer welfare.
91 The first component is “value for money”. Consumer 
welfare is enhanced if the price of goods/services is reduced, or the quality of those goods 
is increased while the price is not changed. The second component is consumer choice. 
Choice does not have value in itself. Nonetheless, if consumers have different tastes, then 
consumer welfare may increase if they can choose from a larger number of products, that 
is,  by  the  entry  of  more  producers  of  differentiated  goods  onto  the  market.  The  last 
component is innovation. Consumers may benefit and consumer welfare may increase if 
new products/services are developed, on the basis that there is actual or potential demand 
for the new products/services.
92 
 
Promotion of consumer welfare has traditionally been considered as one of the aims of 
antitrust, though not the sole aim, both in the United States
 and in Europe.
93 In the United 
States  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  (“FTC”)  acts  to  ensure  that  markets  operate 
efficiently to benefit consumers. In the UK the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) declares 
that the OFT’s goal is to make markets work well for consumers. Most academics seem 
to agree that consumer protection must be the aim of antitrust policy. On the basis of this 
wide consensus on the need for an economic approach under which the protection of 
consumer surplus is the objective of competition policy, the European Commission has 
recently  issued  a  “Guidance”  document  on  exclusionary  abuses
94.    This  Guidance 
document , which only addresses unilateral conduct enforcement priorities under Article 
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102, will be discussed in the next subsection, and compared to the approach prevailing in 
the U.S. during the last years. 
 
 
3.2. The European Guidance Paper and a comparison with the American approach 
 
Without  doubt,  both  the  European  and  American  antitrust  enforcement  have  rapidly 
converged  toward  an  economics-based  approach  in  the  last  few  years.  The  main 
differences remain in the general attitude toward market dominance and in the antitrust 
treatment of abuse of dominance/monopolization issues, which are extremely important 
not only for their impact on the effectiveness of competition, but also for their possible 
interference  with  aggressive  competition  (which  is  often  borderline  with  abusive 
practices) and with innovation policy (which must protect some degree of market power 
to guarantee the proper incentives to invest). The different approaches are well illustrated 
by the Report issued by the U.S. Department of Justice in September 2008, Competition 
and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
95 and by the 
Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 102 to Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct, issued by the European Commission three months later. The U.S. 
Report  largely  reflects  the  approach  to  antitrust  that  was  prevailing  during  the  Bush 
Administration,  on  which  we  focus  in  what  follows.  The  Obama  Administration  has 
announced a change of approach (with the DoJ withdrawing the same Report), but it is 
not clear yet how wide will be this change. 
 
The approach emerging from the U.S. Report is aimed at the defense of the competitive 
process both in principle and in practice, reflecting “a national commitment to the use of 
free  markets  to  allocate  resources  efficiently  and  to  spur  the  innovation  that  is  the 
principal source of economic growth.” The analysis of dominance pays a lot of attention 
to the limits imposed by endogenous entry, emphasizing the role of entry pressure in 
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disciplining  market  leaders  notwithstanding  their  large  market  shares.  The  Report 
provides an enlightening example which is in perfect accordance with the implications of 
the economic approach:  
 
“Suppose a large firm competes with a fringe of small rivals, all producing a 
homogenous product. In this situation, the large firm's market share is only one 
determinant of its market power over price ... if the fringe firms can readily and 
substantially increase production at their existing plants in response to a small 
increase in the large firm's price (that is if the fringe supply is highly elastic), a 
decision by the large firm to restrict output may have no effect on market prices.” 
 
In general, the Report recognizes the poor correlation that can exist between market share 
and market power, especially in high-tech sectors:  
 
“in markets characterized by rapid technological change, for example, a high 
market share of current sales or production may be consistent with the presence 
of robust competition over time rather than a sign of monopoly power. In those 
situations, any power a firm may have may be both temporary and essential to the 
competitive process.” 
 
As a consequence the U.S. Department of Justice adopts a non-intrusive role for antitrust 
policy in the competition in and for the markets. For instance, predatory pricing can be 
established only when recoupment is likely, that is, only when entry is difficult once the 
market  is  monopolized.  Moreover,  the  tying  is  recognized  as  having  primarily  an 
efficiency role (with this view marking a break with the historical hostility to tying), 
especially  technological  tying,    “an  area  where  enforcement  intervention  poses  a 
particular  risk  of  harming  consumers  more  than  it  helps  them  in  the  long  run. 
Technological  tying  often  efficiently  gives  consumers  features  they  want  and  judicial 
control of product design risks chilling innovation.” 
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Finally, the Report also downplays the need for intervention in cases of  refusal to supply, 
because “forcing a competitor with monopoly power to deal with rivals can undermine 
the  incentives  of  either  or  both  to  innovate”  and  because  “judges  and  enforcement 
agencies are ill-equipped to set and supervise the terms on which inputs, property rights, 
or resources are provided.” In our reading of the U.S. approach over the last few years, 
this is based on the belief that competitive entry forces are the main constraints on the 
exercise of market power and when they are present antitrust intervention should be seen 
as a last resort, in line with the economic approach outlined in the previous section.
96 
 
In  contrast  with  this  and  despite  some  recent  progress,  European  unilateral  conduct 
enforcement is characterized by a more interventionist and discretionary approach. The 
European  Commission  Guidance  cited  above    aims  to  orient  enforcement  toward  an 
"effect-based" approach that will maximize consumer welfare and protect an effective 
competitive  process,  and  not  simply  competitors.  An  important  new  aspect  in  the 
Guidance is the emphasis given to the role of entry in determining whether a dominant 
position exists or not. The key element in the Guidance definition of dominance is the 
extent  to  which  a  firm  can  behave  independently  of  its  competitors,  customers  and 
consumers, which is determined by the degree of competitive constraints exerted on this 
firm by the supply of actual competitors, by the threat of expansion of competitors and 
potential entrants, and by the bargaining power of customers. Thus, entry plays a crucial 
role and a finding of dominance should be incompatible with the presence of a threat of 
endogenous  entry.    The  Guidance  acknowledges  that a  leader  “can  be  deterred  from 
increasing prices if expansion or entry is likely, timely and sufficient”, but in our view it 
would also be  important to recognize that the same entry pressure can induce the leader 
to decrease its prices below those of the rivals, or to adopt other aggressive strategies, 
without any anti-competitive purpose, as the endogenous market structures approach has 
made clear. 
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Disappointingly, much of the detailed language in the 2008 Guidance contrasted with the 
broad-brush  passages  purporting  to  move  EU  enforcement  towards  an  effects-based 
approach focused on anticompetitive foreclosure and consumer harm, either contradicting 
outright  the  high-level  messaging  in  the  text,  or  leaving  enforcement  officials  wide 
latitude to make exceptions to the guiding principles in their application of the law.  An 
example of this is the nature of the foreclosure effects to be examined under the “effects-
based” approach. The Guidance indicates that a key element of abuse is anti-competitive 
foreclosure,  defined  as  “a  situation  where  effective  access  of  actual  or  potential 
competitors to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of 
the dominant undertaking” which is likely to profitably increase its prices with harm for 
consumers. However, it is not entirely clear which facts are going to prove foreclosure 
and which not. For instance, consider a situation in which new competitors enter in the 
market and some  competitors  increase  their  market  share to  a  significant  extent:  one 
would expect that this proves that the dominant company's practice is not abusive, but not 
even this can be taken for granted on the basis of the Guidance as a case analyzed below 
will make clear. 
 
Another issue is about the standard of undistorted competition. As regards pricing abuses, 
the European approach introduces the “as efficient competitor” test:  
 
“the  Commission  will  normally  intervene  where  the  conduct  concerned  has 
already been or is capable of hampering competition from competitors which are 
considered to be as efficient as the dominant undertaking.”  
 
However, the document introduces several exceptions to this principle (for instance, a 
dynamic view for which less efficient competitors may become as efficient in the future 
through network or learning effects), and the test does not apply to non-pricing abuses. 
This means that companies are left without a clear standard. 
 
A crucial aspect of the economic approach to antitrust is related to the efficiencies created 
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Guidance of an efficiency defense: a conduct that may seem prima facie to be abusive 
may be justified by objective necessity or efficiencies that will benefit consumers. A 
dominant  firm  may  justify  a  conduct  leading  to  foreclosure  on  the  ground  that 
efficiencies are sufficient to guarantee that consumers are not penalized. The burden of 
proof is on the dominant firm, that has to show, with a sufficient degree of probability 
and on the basis of verifiable evidence, that the efficiencies are the result of the conduct, 
that  this  is  indispensable  (there  is  no  less  anticompetitive  way)  to  produce  the  same 
efficiencies, and that these efficiencies more than compensate the negative effects on 
competition and consumer welfare. 
Now,  while  the  consideration  of  efficiencies  generated  by  a  conduct  is  extremely 
important to re-direct antitrust policy toward the maximization of consumer welfare, in 
our view the Commission’s Communication appears to adopt too vague an approach and 
to make it hard, if not impossible, for dominant companies actually to avail themselves of 
the  efficiencies  defence.  The  main  reason  is  that  their  verification  appears  to  be 
postponed  after  the  establishment  of  an  anticompetitive  foreclosure  that  harms 
consumers,  and  not  during  the  decision  on  whether  the  same  foreclosure  harms 
consumers. Moreover, there appears to be a bias against the possibility that efficiencies 
can occur: they are explicitly considered “unlikely” for predation, and their treatment in 
the  document  is  marginal.  In  addition, issues  such  as the  most effective  remedies  in 
Article 102 cases as well as the treatment of conduct of non-dominant firms still remain 
highly controversial issues.  
 
Notice  that,  to  assert  a  successful  efficiency  defense  under  the  proposed  framework, 
dominant  firms  will  be  required  to show  that there  are no  other  less  anticompetitive 
alternatives to achieve the claimed efficiencies. This condition means that liability could 
be imposed  even  on  a  conduct  whose  efficiency  is  larger  than  its  adverse  effects  on 
competitors simply because there exist alternatives that would have penalized rivals less. 
We doubt that such a rule would have any economic justification. Notwistanding this, 
does the current rule mean that an efficiency defense must be rejected if the conduct 
creates  more  efficiency  gains  than  other  conducts,  but  is  more  restrictive  on  the Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
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competitors? In other words, is it the size of the efficiencies that matters or what matters 
is the amount of restrictions imposed on competition to obtain those efficiencies?  
 
Last, it is not clear why to exclude the possibility of an efficiency defense (and with it the 
possibility  to  enhance  consumer  welfare)  is  to  be  off-limits  for  an  entire  class  of 
companies,  as  the  Commission’s  document  makes  clear  when  it  states  that  an 
“exclusionary  conduct  which  maintains,  creates  or  strengthens  a  market  position 
approaching that of a monopoly can normally not be justified on the grounds that it also 
creates efficiency gains”. In our view, efficiencies should be assessed in the same manner 
in  all  cases,  regardless  of  the  defendant's  market  share:  firms  that  generate  pro-
competitive efficiencies that benefit consumers should not be penalized, regardless of the 
level of market share or potential impact on less efficient competitors.  
 
Finally,  the  new  guidelines  do  not  seem  to  reduce  the  amount  of  uncertainty  that  is 
associated with the move toward the rule of reason approach. For instance, the potential 
conflicts between IPRs protection and antitrust policy remain entirely unsolved: while the 
U.S. have taken a clear position against the possibility of compulsory licensing of IPRs, 
the E.U. approach still contemplates this possibility under vague conditions. This kind of 
uncertainty  can  be  a  source  of  inefficiency  and  distorted  behavior,  especially  when 
decision  rules  are  imperfect  and  subject  to  errors.  The  lack  of  legal  certainty  is 
particularly regrettable in a context of increasing punitive fines and important efforts by 
the  Commission  to  increase  the  scope  for  private  enforcement  to  complement  public 
enforcement  of  E.U.  competition  law.  More  in  general,  antitrust  uncertainty  on 
exclusionary strategies may deter genuinely competitive or innovative strategies to be 
adopted by leading firms, and therefore it may exert negative consequences on consumer 
welfare.  
 
In conclusion, while the approach of the U.S. Report is close to the Chicago School or at 
least to the principles emerging from the endogenous market structures approach, the 
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which is biased against market leaders and in favor of their competitors in a way that can 
be largely unrelated to the real protection of consumers. 
 
3.3. Recent developments  
 
Even as the Commission’s Competition Directorate-General was drafting the Guidance 
paper, the Microsoft case was working its way through the Court of First Instance (now 
the General Court).  The Commission’s Decision on Microsoft had been an exception to 
the trend that the Commission was supposed to be following towards a consumer welfare 
objective. As such the Decision can be seen as an important and unfortunate precedent. In 
its 2007  Microsoft judgement,  the General Court upheld a Commission decision  that 
was based on a per se finding of an infringement rather than an effects-based, rule of 
reason analysis – no evidence of consumer harm was ever adduced by DG Competition. 
In order to address the implications of this case on the future enforcement of Article 102, 
some brief background on the case is necessary.
97 
 
In  its  analysis,  the  Commission  accused  Microsoft  of  infringing  Article  102  by:  1) 
refusing  to  supply  interoperability  information  and  allow  its  use  for  the  purpose  of 
developing and distributing work group server operating system products, and 2) making 
the  availability  of  the  Windows  Client  PC  Operating  System  conditional  on  the 
simultaneous acquisition of Windows Media Player (WMP). 
 
As regards the refusal to supply, according to the Commission, Microsoft had refused to 
provide  Sun  Microsystems  with  information  enabling  it  to  design  work  group  server 
operating  systems  that  could  seamlessly  integrate  in  the  “Active  Directory  domain 
architecture”, a web of interrelated client PC-to-server and server-to-server protocols that 
organize Windows work group networks. Microsoft’s refusal was held to be eliminating 
competition in the relevant market for work group server operating systems because the 
refused input was indispensable for competitors operating in that market. Microsoft’s 
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refusal could limit technical development to the prejudice of consumers, a violation of 
Article 102(b). If competitors had access to the refused information, they would be able 
to  provide  new  and/or  enhanced  products  to  the  consumer.  The  Commission  further 
asserted  that  Microsoft’s  conduct  involved  a  disruption  of  previous,  higher  levels  of 
supply, and caused a risk of elimination of competition in work group server operating 
systems. As regards tying, the Commission argued that Microsoft infringed Article 102 
by  illegally  tying  WMP  to  the  Windows  PC  operating  system  (Windows).  The 
Commission based its finding of a tying abuse on four elements: (i) Microsoft held a 
dominant position in the PC operating system market; (ii) the Windows PC operating 
system and WMP were two separate products; (iii) Microsoft did not give customers a 
choice to obtain Windows without WMP; and (iv) this tying foreclosed competition. In 
addition, the Commission rejected Microsoft’s arguments to justify the tying of WMP. 
The Commission argued that the tying of WMP to Windows foreclosed competition and 
afforded Microsoft unmatched ubiquity of its media player on PCs worldwide. 
 
The General Court argued that the refusal by an undertaking holding a dominant position 
to license a third party to use a product covered by an intellectual property right could not 
in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102. It 
was only in exceptional circumstances that the exercise of the exclusive right by the 
owner of the intellectual property right might give rise to such an abuse. It added that the 
following circumstances, in particular, must be considered to be exceptional: in the first 
place,  the  refusal  relates  to  a  product  or  service  indispensable  to  the  exercise  of  a 
particular activity on a neighboring market; in the second place, the refusal is of such a 
kind as to exclude any effective competition on that neighboring market; in the third 
place, the refusal prevents the appearance of a new product for which there is potential 
consumer demand. Once it is established that such circumstances are present, the refusal 
by the holder of a dominant position to grant a licence may infringe Article 102 unless 
the refusal is objectively justified. Microsoft did not prove that these circumstances were 
not  present  and  there  was  no  objective  justification.  Moreover,  the  General  Court 
concluded that the Commission analysis of bundling was also correct. The Commission 
argued that Microsoft has a dominant position on the client PC operating systems market, Prof. Federico Etro & Dr. Ioannis Kokkoris       Toward an Economic Approach to Article 102 
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that streaming media players and client PC operating systems are two separate products, 
that Microsoft does not give customers the choice of obtaining Windows without WMP 
and that this tying forecloses competition in the media players market, and cannot be 
objectively justified.  
 
The  decision  of  the  General  Court  was  somewhat  surprising,  since  it  upheld  both 
infringements,  although  the  WMP  did  not  seem  to  induce  consumer  demand  as  a 
standalone  product  and  was  competing  in  a  secondary  market  with  endogenous  and 
competitive  entry.  Thus,  there  seemed  to  be  no  actual  consumer  harm  or  predatory 
purpose  from  bundling  the  Media  Player  with  Windows.  The  per  se  type  approach 
adopted in this case contradicts the rule of reason approach that the Commission seems to 
envisage using in Article 102 cases.
98 It will be interesting to see how the Commission 
will reconcile the thinking of the General Court in its Microsoft judgment with the trend 
towards an effects based approach in  Article 102 cases. The decision of the General 
Court came as a shock to a good proportion of the EU antitrust observers, many of whom 
had doubts as to the compatibility of the Commission’s original decision with EC case 
law and sound economic policy (including the concern for consumer welfare that the 
Commission claimed). It will be a step backwards in the development of the competition 
case  law  if  the  trend  towards  a  consumer  welfare  objective  in  Article  102  cases  is 
diverted as a result of the Microsoft judgment.
99 
 
In a further example of competition enforcement appearing at variance with economic 
evidence, 2008 saw the Commission launch another  investigation into Microsoft, this 
time  into  the  alleged  tying  of  the  Internet  Explorer  (IE)  browser  to  Windows.  This 
investigation concluded at the end of 2009, with a so-called Article 9 Decision pursuant 
to which Microsoft will now distribute its operating systems with a “choice screen” that 
reminds PC users that they can select a browser other than IE as their “default” browser, 
and  facilitates  the  downloading  of  Microsoft’s  competitors’  products  (e.g.  Mozilla 
Firefox, Google Chrome, etc.). To evaluate this outcome, we need to have a look at its 
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background.  In  the  last  twelve  years,  Microsoft  has  distributed  its  operating  system 
bundled with IE - and for eight of those twelve years, this has been done under a Consent 
Decree issued by the U.S. antitrust authorities. Even without the choice screen offering an 
opportunity to download rivals' browsers, alternative browsers could be easily installed 
on every PC. Competition in the field has been on the basis of quality and functionality, 
at least since the introduction of IE in the mid-90s resulted in browsers’ prices dropping 
to zero. Recently Mozilla's Firefox has seen considerable success, with the gap between 
IE and Firefox's respective market shares narrowing with every passing month; Opera 
and  Safari  have  consolidated  their  market  positions,  while  the  new  entrant,  Google 
Chrome, has quickly picked up about six percent of the global market. This tendency is 
even stronger in Europe. 
 
In spite of such a dynamic competitive scenario, following a formal complaint by Opera, 
in January 2009 the European Commission sent a Statement of Objections to Microsoft 
concerning the possible anti-competitive consequences of tying Windows with IE. The 
Commission was applying the judgment rendered by the General Court in the WMP case, 
where Microsoft was forced to commercialise a new operating system without its WMP, 
which, by the way, no one purchased.
  
 
To a large extent, the browser industry seems extremely competitive, with a firm that is 
the leader in a primary market (operative systems) pressured by entry and innovation in a 
secondary  market  (browsers).  The  latter  is  characterised  by  an  increasing  degree  of 
product differentiation (in terms of performance and visual experience) and by demand 
that  overlaps  with  the  primary  good  (almost  any  PC  has  access  to  the  Internet)  and 
typically  covers  multiple  browsers  at  the  same  time  (Internet  users  often  try,  and 
sometimes use, different browsers on their devices). According to the endogenous market 
structure approach to antitrust, exactly under these conditions, tying becomes a normal 
aggressive  strategy  of  the  leader  without  exclusionary  purposes,  but  aimed  at 
strengthening  competition  and  reducing  prices  in  the  secondary  market  to  gain  scale 
economies in the secondary market (against a modest sacrifice of profits in the primary 
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market reinforces innovation by leaders and followers, producing important consumer 
benefits in terms of price, quality, and product variety. In such a scenario, it was hard to 
see other pervasive anti-competitive consequences of the Microsoft strategy. It seemed 
unlikely that it could have a predatory purpose because any future increase in the price of 
IE would have been unrealistic. Moreover, Microsoft mostly gains from the introduction 
and  the  diffusion  of  other  browsers  because  this  increases  the  quality  of  PC  user 
experience  and  therefore  the  demand  for  Windows  and  Office  applications,  its  main 
products. Finally, there are technological efficiencies from the design of an operating 
system  including  a  browser.  In  conclusion,  tying  Windows  with  IE  could  have 
represented a constraint for competing browsers in theory but not in practice; after all, IE 
could be substituted with another browser in a few seconds and freely even before the 
introduction of the choice screen.  
 
With the agreed solution, however, minor browsers and even new entrants will get a 
boost, strengthening the competition against Microsoft. As a matter of fact, the choice 
screen  appears  if  IE  has  been  installed,  but  if  computer  manufacturers  install  an 
alternative  browser  when  shipping  a  new  PC,  no  choice  screen  appears  for  the  final 
consumer:  this  may  represent  a  substantial  advantage  for  Firefox,  Opera,  and  other 
competing  browsers.  What  is  certain  is  that  all  the  possible  constraints  to  entry  and 
competition in the browsers’ market are now eliminated, and it will be interesting to 
verify the effect of this policy shift on the browser market. And of course, it will be 
interesting to check the impact of these decisions on future tying cases.  
 
While the Microsoft saga is at its end, another related tying case may now emerge in a 
related  sector,  this  time  around  a  well  known  but  largely  undisturbed  monopolistic 
position,  that  of  IBM  in  the  mainframe  market.  Even  if  the  mainframe  represents  a 
relatively small percentage by numbers of units of server shipments, rigid demand of 
mainframes by corporate and government customers worldwide along with technological 
peculiarities on the supply side make the mainframe market a largely separate and self-
contained market which provides products that are not substitutable with standard Linux, 
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based on strong product performance and reliability. While a wide leadership is typical of 
markets characterized by network effects, dominance such as that exhibited by IBM goes 
beyond the effects of standard network externalities for the lack of any residual entry 
pressure. In past decades, mainframe customers benefited from the effective competition 
provided  by  manufacturers  of  hardware  compatible  with  IBM  architecture,  such  as 
Hitachi, Amdahl, Comparex, PSI and T3 Technologies, and from the potential entry of 
other producers and software developers. However, in the last several years, IBM has 
gradually  moved  toward  a  policy  of  bundling  and  integration  of  its  hardware  and 
software  products,  thereby  becoming  the  only  company  selling  IBM-compatible 
mainframes.  This  has  allowed  IBM  to  constantly  increase  its  prices  for  mainframe 
solutions, against a declining trend in the rest of the industry. 
 
The European Commission’s Competition Directorate-General started to focus on IBM 
after receiving complaints from a small company, Platform Solutions, Inc. (PSI). In 2006, 
when Hewlett-Packard was about to buy PSI and enhance competition in the mid-range 
framework market, IBM stopped licensing to PSI and filed a patent suit against it. To 
terminate the legal proceedings against PSI, IBM had to buy this company in 2008. Then, 
at the beginning of 2009, IBM faced a second complaint from another smaller rival, T3 
Technologies,  which  accused  IBM  of  preventing  sales  of  rival  mainframe  hardware 
through  bundling  of  its  operating  system  with  its  hardware,  and  withholding  the 
intellectual property rights needed for interoperability. At the end of March 2010, DG 
Competition received a third complaint from TurboHercules, a Paris-based open-source 
company whose request to license z/OS was declined by IBM. Hercules is a “mainframe 
emulator”, a program that allows software designed for IBM computers to run on other 
types of computer hardware, including personal computers. The alleged abuse by IBM 
would be to prevent customers from using Hercules by tying IBM's mainframe operating 
system  to  IBM  hardware.  Meanwhile  even  the  Department  of  Justice  has  started  a 
broader  preliminary  investigation  on  IBM's  dominance  last  autumn,  citing  also  the 
experiences of T3 and Hercules. 
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Given the absolute dominance of IBM in the market and the impossibility of entry it is 
possible that these preliminary investigations will lead to a new EU antitrust case of 
considerable importance. The similarity with the issues underlying the Microsoft cases is 
all too evident. Nevertheless, two major differences should be noted. First, Microsoft was 
not accused of tying hardware with its operating system. Rather, it was accused of tying 
two different software  applications (media players and browsers) with  Windows, and 
both these applications were already facing substantial competition (endogenous entry) in 
their  respective  markets.  Second,  the  interoperability  information  that  Microsoft  was 
forced to licence by the European Commission under its 2004 Decision was protected by 
intellectual property rights and was never advertised as being available free of charge to 
the  open  source  community.  IBM,  on  the  other  hand,  has  pledged  to  share  such 
information with the open source community, at least until now. Despite these differences 
between the IBM and Microsoft cases, the many similarities suggest that IBM may have 
a hard time defending its position against the most recent of the three complaints that 
have  been  submitted  to  the  European  Commission. In  this  and  probably  other future 




In this paper we have examined the European approach to antitrust and in particular to 
abuse of dominance issues from an economic perspective and in particular through the 
lenses of the endogenous market structures approach. This led us to criticize some aspects 
of European policymaking and to suggest a move toward a closer attention to the analysis 
of the entry conditions in abuse of dominance cases. Other aspects of antitrust policy, in 
particular  those  concerning  mergers  and  horizontal  agreements  (especially  in  relation 
with R&D and standardization agreements) would require further investigation from the 
perspective of the endogenous market structures approach. We hope that this and related 
research will contribute to the  improvement of European policymaking in the field of 
antitrust. 
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